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Among the most beautiful and distinctive paintings created by the gifted 
Jesuit artist and architect Giuseppe Castiglione (1688-1766) during his 
sojourn in China was ‘Kazath Tribute Horses’ (Hasake gongma), which 
portrays a kowtowing Kazak leading tribute horses to the Qianlong 
emperor (r. 1736-96) amid rustic furnishings at the Chengde imperial 
summer retreat.1 For several generations of students and scholars of 
Chinese history, this picture represented the essence of China’s foreign 
relations during the imperial era: woolen-robed nomads offering horses and 
other pastoral products as ‘tribute’ (gong) to the Chinese court in return for 
lavish gifts. The image of ‘barbarians’ expressing their recognition of ‘the 
supreme virtue of the Chinese Son of Heaven’ in kneeling and prostrated 
postures, or in Chinese terms, performing the koutou consisting of three 
kneels and nine bows (sangui jiukou), has been enduring. Western language 
accounts of embassies written by eighteenth century visitors to China such 
as Lord Macartney, reinforced earlier Jesuit-authored and Dutch VOC 
representatives’ descriptions of court ritual and ceremony cast in regimental 






1 Painted in 1757. The original is in the Musée Guimet. There are partial 
reproductions in Cécile Beurdeley and Michel Beurdeley, Giuseppe Castiglione: A Jesuit 
Painter at the Court of the Chinese Emperors (London: Lund Humphries 1972) 104-105. 
2 The significance of Macartney’s visit to China for European history is the focus of 
the volume by Alain Peyrefitte, L’empire immobile ou le choc des mondes (Paris 1989). See 
also my critique of this work, H. Zurndorfer, ‘La sinologie immobile’, Études 
chinoises 8 (1989) 99-120. Another important study of the Macartney embassy is 
James Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 
1793 (Durham, NC 1995). John Wills’ book, Embassies and Illusions: Dutch and 
Portuguese Envoys to K’ang-hsi, 1666-1687 (Cambridge, MA 1984) opens with an 
account of Pieter van Hoorn’s embassy to China in 1666. 





‘Kazaks presenting horses in tribute’ (cat. 23. Musée Guimet, Paris): Continues next 
page. Bron: Cécile and Michel Beurdeley, Giuseppe Castiglione, A Jesuit painter at the 
court of the Chinese Emperors (London: Lund Humphries 1971) 104-105. 
 
 
downhill phase which the late eminent American scholar of modern 
Chinese history, John K. Fairbank (1907-91), called its ‘long twilight’.3
As is well-known, Fairbank was the first Western scholar to 
conceptualize about the diplomatic and strategic practices known as the 
‘tribute system’, first in an article written with Ssu-yü Teng (1941),4 then in a  
  
 
                                                 
3 John K. Fairbank, ‘The Early Treaty System in the Chinese World Order’ in: J. 
Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
MA 1968) 263. 
4 J.K.Fairbank and Ssu-yü Teng, ‘On the Ch’ing Tribute System’, Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies 6 (1941) 135-246.  






chapter in his book Trade and Diplomacy on the Chinese Coast (1953),5 and 
finally, in his introduction to the volume The Chinese World Order (1968).6 
Fairbank’s model of the tribute system specified: 
 
In order to deal with the Chinese, foreign rulers were required to 
send tribute embassies periodically to the Chinese emperor. When an 
embassy reached the Chinese border, Chinese officials immediately 
took charge and accompanied the foreign envoys to the capital. The 
Chinese government bore all the expenses of the embassy during its 
stay in China. Its officials taught the envoys the proper etiquette for 
their appearance at court. After the envoys had been properly 
coached, they had an audience with the emperor. They performed 
the rituals, including the kotow, a symbolic recognition of their 
inferiority and, more important, of their acknowledgment of their 
status as envoys of a ‘vassal’ state or tribe. Their conduct at court 
                                                 
5 John K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty 
Ports, 1852-1854 (Cambridge, MA 1953). 
6 J.K. Fairbank, ‘A Preliminary Framework’ in: idem The Chinese World Order, 1-19. 




implied that their ruler was subordinate to the emperor. Once they 
concluded this ritual, the emperor summoned them closer to the 
throne for a brief conversation. Then they offered their tribute of 
native goods to him, and he, in turn, bestowed valuable gifts upon 
them and their ruler. The audience ended, and the envoys then had 
three to five days to trade with Chinese merchants.7
 
According to Fairbank, the tribute system was a kind of ‘diplomatic 
medium’ by which the Chinese court enshrined its cultural superiority over 
surrounding peoples and mythologized the Chinese emperor’s sovereignty 
over all humankind. ‘In theory, they (i.e. the vassals) were irresistibly drawn 
into this relationship, they “came and were transformed” (laihua), by the 
superior blessings of (Chinese) civilization’.8 Moreover, the hierarchy which 
bound Chinese society within its walls also extended to include foreign 
lands; just as the Son of Heaven categorized his subjects according to social 
and political rank, he classified foreign lands.9 As the cover illustration of 
The Chinese World Order shows, Fairbank visualized China’s relationship with 
its neighbours as a series of concentric rings, with China at the center. And 
nearest to this ‘Sinic’ center were those countries like Vietnam and Korea 
which had institutionalized the Chinese language and philosophy into their 
governments, while peripheral peoples, i.e. nomadic steppe groups,10 ‘on the 
fringe of the Chinese cultural area’, formed the second zone away from the 
center. Finally, at the outer zones were far away waiyi (outer barbarians) 
located either over land or sea, and which included Japan and states of 
Southeast and South Asia, and eventually, European nations.11  
At the same time, Fairbank stressed, one should not downplay the 
trade factor in all this: there were commercial interests at stake under all this 
ritualistic coating. In fact, what sustained the tribute system over periods of 
                                                 
7 Morris Rossabi, ‘Introduction’ in: M.Rossabi ed., China among Equals: The Middle 
Kingdom and its Neighbors, 10th–14th Centuries (Berkeley 1983) 2. See also, Fairbank, ‘A 
Preliminary Framework’, 1-4. 
8 Fairbank, ‘Preliminary Framework’, 9. 
9 Ibidem, 11. 
10 ‘Nomadic steppe groups’ refer to non-Chinese peoples inhabiting the regions 
stretching from Manchuria through Mongolia and Turkestan to Tibet. Throughout 
most of their history, they depended on the rearing of horses and sheep for 
their livelihood, and regularly migrated in search of pasture lands according to 
climatic conditions. 
11 Ibidem, 2. 




Chinese history was that it had become an ‘ingenious vehicle’ for trade.12 
China needed horses, pastoral products and the steppe peoples regularly 
bartered these for tea and silk. China also used the trade factor to buy 
loyalty and military allies. For example, when the Qing court mustered 
Dutch naval support in the campaign against Ming loyalist foes in Taiwan in 
the 1670s, it announced special trading privileges to the VOC.13 The tribute 
system did have a pragmatic side, but its rhetoric forbid any notion of 
‘private trade’ outside the basic framework of suzerain-vassal. 
While Fairbank may have been the first foreign scholar to theorize 
the underpinnings of the tribute system, he was by no means the first 
Western expert to interest himself in Sino-foreign relations. The earliest 
European sinologists such as the French scholars Jean Pierre Abel-Rémusat 
and Stanislaus Julien, had studied the Chinese documentary record on non-
Sinitic peoples. Along with Edouard Chavannes, they translated sources on 
Chinese travellers, Uighurs, Turks, and others. N. Ya Bičurin did the same 
in Russian with translations of Chinese materials on several Central Asian 
peoples. Other well-known China scholars who committed such 
translations include the German August Pfizmaier on Korean-Chinese 
contacts. English translations by Friedrich Hirth on the Roman East, Emil 
Bretschneider on Central and West Asia, E.H. Parker on the Turks, and 
S.W. Bushell on Tibet were also published. 
So engaging was the matter of Sino-foreign relations for European 
scholars during the nineteenth century that by the time Henri Cordier 
compiled the Bibliotheca sinica: dictionnaire bibliographique des ouvrages relatifs à 
l’empire chine (Paris, 1893-95), it was clear that this subject was a major 
attraction to the budding academic community of sinologists: more than 
half of the 70,000 entries in this bibliography were about Chinese foreign 
relations. Many of these publications were annotated translations. As one 
modern scholar has remarked, these translations were valuable in that they 
made ‘Chinese history a part of world history’.14 On the other hand, the 
same writer pointed out, the problem of the annotated translation was its 
                                                 
12 Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast, 32. 
13 But when the Dutch forces did not materialize after the emperor had petitioned 
their services, the Qing government withdrew these privileges. See John Wills, 
‘Ch’ing Relations with the Dutch’ in: Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order, 236-42. 
14 Timothy Connor, ‘Review Article: Translating the “Barbarians”: A New Book in 
an Old Tradition’, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 32 (1972) 241. 




role as an ‘extension of the Chinese exegetical tradition’.15 These nineteenth 
century sinologists accepted the Chinese ‘predigested’ accounts of foreign 
peoples, thereby perpetuating traditional Chinese myths and assumptions 
about foreign relations, and China’s position vis-a-vis other regions. In 
other words, these scholars adopted a Sino-centric orientation that rejected 
features of international relations not consonant with Chinese theoretical 
conditions. They did not challenge the frequent narrative lacunae nor did 
they attempt to fill in these gaps with information in other sections of the 
dynastic histories or other sources. 
 
 
New Views on the ‘Tribute System’ 
 
According to Frederick Mote, when the first Europeans encountered the 
rigidities of the tribute system, ‘they were made to believe that...[it] 
represented the pattern of all earlier Chinese history’.16 He writes: 
 
The founders of the Ming dynasty after 1368, following their 
expulsion of the Mongols, then reconstructed a much earlier tribute 
system and vigorously reimposed a sinocentric world order. Their 
restoration was so successful that by the time the European maritime 
powers began to enter the East Asian shipping lanes in the sixteenth 
century, they had little reason not to believe what they were told 
about it. Both they and the Chinese with whom they dealt believed 
that it had ‘always’ been so; in proof, ancient writings in abundance 
were cited.17
 
Mote has built his argument, i.e. the tribute system was not really what 
European foreigners came to take for granted, upon other modern 
scholarship. Recent analyses of the interstate relations between China 
during the Song dynasty (960-1279) with its neighbouring regimes, the Liao 
(Qidan or Khitan, 916-1125), Xia (Dangxiang or Tangut, 1038-1227), and Jin 
(Nüzhen or Jurchen, 1115-1234) dynasties from the tenth to the thirteenth 
centuries were anything but Sinocentric. It was an era of ‘China among 
equals’, as the title of one collection of studies on this period calls this phase 
                                                 
15 Ibidem, Connor refers here to the argumentation of Arthur F. Wright, ‘The Study 
of Chinese Civilization’, Journal of the History of Ideas 21 (1960) 233-255.  
16 F.W. Mote, Imperial China 900-1800 (Cambridge, MA 1999) 376. 
17 Ibidem, 376-77. 




of China’s foreign relations.18 During this time, China faced formidable 
nomadic steppe peoples who had the military means to destroy the country. 
Song officials, recognizing the military and political weaknesses of their 
government, adopted a realistic and pragmatic foreign policy, thereby 
accepting these foreign states as equals. Diplomatic parity defined the 
relations between Song China and the Liao, Xia, and Jin governments. 
Interestingly, even the official history of the Song dynasty, the Songshi, and 
other contemporary semi-official written records acknowledged the 
evidence of this interlude in Sino-foreign relations—‘Chinese culture 
demanded that [China’s statesmen and historians] be responsible historians, 
in recording if not always in interpreting. The facts are there.’19 One 
compilation, for example, the Cefu yuangui (Outstanding Models from the 
Storehouse of Literature; completed in 1013) acknowledged that for some 
time Korea, one of China’s tribute vassals, was paying tribute to the Liao 
dynasty.20  
Another modern scholar, Takeshi Hamashita reminds us that the 
tribute system ‘did not function in a single dimension only’.21 A country 
paid tribute to China while it expected tribute from its neighbors. In this 
way, the tribute system acted as a loose system of political integration 
embracing maritime Asia, from Northeast Asia to East Asia, and then from 
Southeast Asia to Oceania. So, as written records confirm, Vietnam 
demanded tribute from Laos, and Korea while a tributary to the Middle 
Kingdom, also sent tribute missions to Japan.22 This network of 
relationships also had an important economic side. Reviewing Asia’s trade 
history since the sixteenth century, Hamashita notes: 
 
It can be shown that the foundation for the whole complex tribute-
trade formation was determined by the price structure of China and 
                                                 
18 Rossabi, China among Equals. See note 7. 
19 Mote, Imperial China, 377. 
20 Wang Qinruo et.al., Cefu yuangui (completed in 1013; photo-reprint of 1642 
edition), chapter 956:11237.  
21 Takeshi Hamashita, ‘The Tribute System and Modern Asia’ in: A.J.H. Latham 
and Heita Kawakatsu eds., Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy (London 
and New York 1994) 92. 
22 Ibidem. See also Takeshi Hamashita, ‘The Intra-regional System in East Asia in 
Modern Times’ in: Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi eds., Network Power: 
Japan and Asia (Ithaca 1997) 113-35. 




that the tribute-trade zone formed an integrated ‘silver zone’ in 
which silver was used as the medium of trade settlement. The key to 
the functioning of the tribute system as a system was the huge 
‘demand’ for commodities outside China and the difference between 
prices inside and outside China.23
 
Thus, in this conceptualization, China’s tribute system was part of a wider 
series of political and economic networks that encompassed those 
individuals and groups who were not necessarily part of the official ‘tribute 
system’.24  
One should also not underestimate the ‘irregular trade’ factor, i.e. the 
role of traders or ‘pirates’ who aimed to gain wealth and riches from the 
rising commerce along the China coast and beyond since the mid-sixteenth 
century. The commercial ambitions of both Chinese and foreign merchants 
could never, and more importantly, were never satisfied by the official 
rhetoric banning ‘private trade’.25 And there is sufficient material evidence 
to prove the success of their enterprise: one need only regard the Chinese 
influences on the architecture, ceramics, and furniture of Java which was an 
important entrepôt for Chinese traders for centuries.26 In sum, these new 
views of the tribute system which link the important role of private trade 
to wider networks of Chinese contact have correctly redirected attention 
away from the Sinocentric vision as the chief focal point of imperial China’s 
foreign relations.  
 
 
Unravelling the ‘Tribute System’ Model 
 
How then did the mythology of an ever unchanging Sinocentric ‘tribute 
system’ take hold? There are at least three factors which need to be 
considered here. First, the way historical study developed in Europe and the 
United States during the first half of the twentieth century obliterated, or 
simply ignored, the contributions of regions outside northwest Europe to 
                                                 
23 Hamashita, ‘The Tribute Trade’, 96-7. 
24 These series of Asian networks are described and analysed in K.N. Chaudhuri, 
Asia before Europe (Cambridge 1990). 
25 A good introduction to the role of seafarers and merchants in maritime China is 
Robert J. Antony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea: The World of Pirates and Seafarers in 
Late Imperial South China (Berkeley 2003). 
26 Denys Lombard, Le Carrefour javanais II (Paris 1990) 266-76. 




the making of the modern world. Although writers and historians long ago 
recognized the ‘near eastern’ or ‘Oriental’ origins of the West, and 
eventually the significance of Asian trade routes and the voyages of 
discovery, the general presentation in prewar textbooks was that of a largely 
autonomous West in contrast to an ‘undifferentiated Orient’.27 These 
standard guides themselves were a product of a long trend in the 
development of the discipline of history when nationalism and Western 
European/American ascendancy on a global scale assumed the primacy of 
‘the West’.28 Even after the publication in 1949 of Fernand Braudel’s 
masterpiece Le Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen which told readers of the 
diversity of forces that created the Mediterranean world, and provided an 
intellectual frame of reference to counter narratives of the ‘grand transition’ 
from tradition to modernity, it would still take several decades before 
scholars would admit that European ‘modernization’ was not necessarily a 
product of European uniqueness.29 Given China’s geographical distance 
from West Europe and the formidable challenges in learning Chinese, it is 
not surprising that Westerners accepted without question what they read 
about China’s foreign relations in diplomatic and missionary accounts and 
press reports. Moreover, as mentioned above, those Western scholars who 
were able to read and translate Chinese sources were the foremost 
contributors to the myth of the centrality of the tribute system to China’s 
foreign relations.  
A second reason for the widespread acceptance of the tribute system 
mythology was Fairbank’s influence on the development of the study of 
Chinese history. His impact, both as a scholar and a teacher of generations 
of scholars at Harvard University, should not be underrated. In the many 
editions of his book The United States and China (Cambridge MA, 1948; 1958;  
 
                                                 
27 This is the theme of the influential work by Edward Said, Orientalism (New York 
1978). 
28 For further information on how this tendency affected the study of Chinese 
history, see H. Zurndorfer, ‘What the Concept of “The Rise of the West” Teaches 
Us about the Writing of Chinese History’, Theoretische Geschiedenis 25 (1998) 350-369. 
29 There are scholars who continue to write that there is something distinctive in 
the European past that explains its special economic development and power. See, 
for example, David Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich 
and Some So Poor (New York 1998). 





‘Departure of a loo choo junk with tribute to Pekin’ c. 1830. Drawn by W. Smyth, 
engraved by E. Finden. ‘Shews a large junk in harbour with many native boats 
surrounding her. Luchu Island is on the horizon. In the fifteenth century, the Ming 
Dynasty of China laid claim to the Archipelago of Luchu, and at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century it was conquered by the Japanese. (…) a tribute vessel was 
sent annually to China, which was regarded more as their suzerain than Japan, 
although tribute was also paid to the latter.’ Bron: Orange, The Chater Collection,  464, 
476. 
 
1971; 1979) as well as in the prestigious textbook he wrote with Edwin O.  
Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, A History of East Asian Civilization (Boston 
1960; 1965), Fairbank presented the tribute system as one of the key 
institutions curbing China’s development into the modern world. According 
to him, the first Opium War (1839-41) was the result of a ‘clash of cultures’. 
On the one hand, there was Britain, determined to insist upon commercial 
free exchange and, on the other hand, there was the Qing court which was 
just as determined to refuse diplomatic relations with the West outside the 
framework of the tributary system. In this presentation of China’s situation 
in the early nineteenth century, Fairbank was arguing that cultural factors 
constrained the country’s leaders from overcoming traditional ‘Confucian’ 
biases toward the value of trade as well as technology, and confirming 
Chinese history’s traditional periodization according to the dynastic cycle. In 
the dynastic cycle framework, the nineteenth century was the final phase of 
a process of formation, maturation, and decay, and in Fairbank’s view, 




China’s ‘mismanagement’ of these Western ‘barbarians’ was further proof of 
the downhill phase of the cycle.  
Fairbank’s own formative influences are also relevant here. As a 
graduate student, first at Oxford where he prepared a doctoral thesis on 
China in the nineteenth century, and later in Beijing under the tutelage of 
the famed historian, diplomat/politician, Jiang Tingfu (also known as T.F. 
Tsiang, 1895-1965) in the early 1930s, he came to perceive the limitations of 
contemporary knowledge of China’s history in the West. Jiang, who himself 
had gained a Ph.D. degree in British political history awarded by Columbia 
University in 1923, realized the extent to which Westerners had 
reconstructed China’s diplomatic history from a Western perspective, and 
that the Chinese side of the story had never received adequate attention.30 
Jiang attempted to overcome these limitations first by studying documents 
originating from some Qing archives that had just been made available, and 
then promoting the advantages of their examination to students and 
scholars, including Fairbank. Jiang introduced him to the Palace Museum 
collection Chouban yiwu shimo (The Management of Barbarian Affairs from A 
to Z) which chronicled China’s foreign contacts. Jiang’s own reading of this 
archive and other compilations led him to conclude that since the Ming 
dynasty, China had linked trade and diplomacy into one system, i.e. tribute. 
In a lecture he gave at the London School of Economics in 1936, he 
explained how imperial China’s ideas on international relations were rooted 
in a deep sense of superiority and a belief that ‘national security could only 
be found in isolation’.31 For Jiang, the Opium War was the very first 
incident in the history of Sino-foreign relations that threatened China’s 
‘traditionalism’. 
Finally, a third factor which helped to contribute to the mythology of 
the ‘tribute system’ was simply lack of information. Until the early 1980s 
when a series of archives were first opened in the People’s Republic of 
China, and also in Taiwan, researchers could not access the bulk of 
materials, including those in the Manchu language, that would lend a new 
perspective to understanding the history of imperial China’s approach to 
                                                 
30 Fairbank devoted an entire chapter in his autobiography, Chinabound: A Fifty-year 
Memoir (New York 1982) 85-93 to his relationship with Jiang. For more on the life 
and career of Jiang Tingfu, see the entry ‘Chiang T’ing-fu’ in: Howard L.Boorman 
and Richard C.Howard eds., Biographical Dictionary of Republican China I (New York 
1971) 354-358. 
31 T’ing-fu Tsiang, ‘China and European Expansion’, Politica 2 (1936) 3-4. 




foreign relations. While Fairbank’s work concentrated on British and 
Chinese interactions in the coastal areas of China during the mid-nineteenth 
century and was based on relatively limited primary documentation in 
Chinese, more recent scholarship examining hitherto unexplored archives, 
has probed China’s relations with other regions during earlier centuries. The 
result is a stunning historiographical shift in the entire conceptualization of 
China’s foreign relations during the Qing dynasty. 
 
 
The Death of the ‘Chinese World Order’ and the Birth of the Qing 
Empire. 
 
Among the most important findings to challenge the old view that the 
Manchus were assimilated into the ‘Chinese world order’ is the discovery of 
the Qing dynasty as a multi-ethnic empire built upon cultural links with 
non-Han peoples and administered through a medley of practical statecraft 
policies.32 The Qing government did not just take over Chinese ways, or 
assimilate with Chinese culture (i.e. sinicize). On the contrary, it instituted 
strategies to protect the Manchu language of the imperial clan as well as to 
preserve the prestige of Mongol culture and Tibetan religion. These 
practices were manifested in the restriction of particular kinds of 
government documents to the Manchu language only, and the recognition 
of Chinese, Mongol, Tibetan, and Uighur as official languages. When the 
                                                 
32 Lack of space prevents me from listing all these new important publications 
contributing to the reformulation of Qing history, but just to name some: Beatrice 
Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch’ing China, 1723-1820 
(Berkeley 1991); Evelyn S. Rawski, The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial 
Institutions (Berkeley 1998); Pamela K.Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and 
Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley 1999); Edward J.M. Rhoads, Manchus and 
Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-
1928 (Seattle 2000); Mark C. Elliot, The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic 
Identity in Late Imperial China (Stanford 2001). Also helpful for understanding the 
implications of this new scholarship are a number of review articles. See Evelyn 
Rawski, ‘Presidential Address--Reenvisioning the Qing: The Significance of the 
Qing Period in Chinese History’, Journal of Asian Studies 55 (1996) 829-50; R. Kent 
Guy, ‘Who Were the Manchus?: A Review Essay’, Journal of Asian Studies 61 (2002) 
151-64; and Sudipta Sen, ‘The New Frontiers of Manchu China and the 
Historiography of Asian Empires: A Review Essay’, Journal of Asian Studies 61 (2002) 
165-77. 




Qing government created a system of three capital cities – one in Inner 
Mongolia (Chengde), one in China (Beijing), and one in Manchuria 
(Mukden) – the Manchus expressed to Chinese and non-Chinese groups, 
most visibly, their double intention: to perpetuate regional heritage, and to 
permit diverse cultures to co-exist within their empire.33 The architecture of 
the three capitals also reflected Manchu aims to separate religious 
ostentation (as in Chengde) from ceremonial monumentality (as in Beijing), 
and from political power (as in Mukden [Shenyang]). To run their empire, 
the Manchus maintained both ‘cosmopolitan’ and ‘ethnic’ modes of 
rulership that incorporated ‘the heavenly mandate, Confucian universal 
culturalism, the concept of Buddhist monarch or chakravartin, the bhikshu-
dānapati or priest-patron relationship with Tibetan and Mongol lamas, 
patronage of Islamic religious institutions, and genealogical links to the 
Chinggisid line and other significant Inner Asian pedigrees’.34  
While the Qing dynasty reclaimed the ‘tribute system’ from their 
Ming predecessors as a tool for foreign relations, it was never the exclusive 
means by which this regime pursued security and stability. In fact, one may 
argue it was the very success of Qing government flexibility in the long-
term management of its foreign relations that prevented its leaders from 
eliciting a major overhaul of its diplomatic and strategic policies in the wake 
of the Opium War’s decisive military defeat.35
 
 
The Tribute System and the East Asian World Order 
 
All this revisionism may lead one to ask: what is the place of the ‘tribute 
system’ concept in future historical studies of China? No doubt scholars 
and students will continue to find the idea integral toward understanding 
the history of Sino-foreign contact during the Ming and Qing era, but they 
may also discover new facets and unexpected details about its utilization, all 
of which confirm the general complexity of Sino-foreign relations. For 
example, in my own recent investigation of China’s involvement in the 
                                                 
33 On this point, see Philippe Forêt, Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscapte Enterprise 
(Honolulu 2000). 
34James A. Millward, ‘A Uighur Muslim in Qianlong’s Court: The Meaning of the 
Fragrant Concubine’, Journal of Asian Studies 53 (1994) 445. 
35James A. Polachek, The Inner Opium War (Cambridge, MA 1992) provides a wealth 
of material to support this point of view. 




defence of its ally Korea in 1592 when Japan sent a force of more than 
100,000 men to invade the country, I encountered a number of 
‘anomalies’.36 Even though Korea was the prototype vassal tributary state, 
the reaction of the Ming government to the Korean king’s cry for help in 
summer 1592 was anything but forthcoming. It would take several weeks of 
debate at court, with the Chinese Emperor Wanli overruling his ministers, 
before the Chinese government would send a rescue army to help the 
Koreans.  
Although China and Korea had had close cultural ties since the 
beginning of the imperial era, the political relations between the two 
countries were far from ideal. The first Ming emperor Zhu Yuanzhang 
(reigned 1368-98) saw Korea as a security problem because its ruling elite, 
through marriage affiliations, continued to maintain close contacts with 
Mongolian chiefs who had formerly ruled China. It was only after this 
emperor’s death, and some decades of negotiations, that the Ming 
government came to accept Korea as a regular tributary state. But even after 
a systematic exchange of embassies between the two countries began in the 
fifteenth century, tensions persisted. Aside from the official tribute items 
China requested, i.e. gold, silver, a number of local products such as 
ginseng, and a fixed supply of stud horses as listed in the Da Ming huidian 
(Collected Statutes of the Great Ming; 1587), the Ming court also demanded 
human tribute: female virgins and male eunuchs to serve the emperor and 
his household were a regular requisition. Korea resented this practice, and 
China objected to Korea’s mismanagement of their mutual military security 
problem, the waves of sea-faring pirates who wrecked havoc along the 
littoral of both countries in the second half of the sixteenth century. China 
claimed that these corsairs, known as wakō, originated in Japan, and blamed 
Korea for not doing enough to curb their predations which eventually 
extended to the coast of southern China in the 1550s and 1560s. Ultimately, 
China solved this problem militarily but became increasingly suspicious of 
Korea’s true loyalty after this episode. During the 1580s Korea also sent a 
number of ‘tributary’ missions to Japan, supposedly in order to prevent 
further conflicts caused by pirates. 
                                                 
36Information concerning this episode can be found in my essay ‘Wanli China 
versus the Dragon’s Head and the Snake’s Tail: Rethinking China’s Involvement in 
the Imjin Waeran’ in: James Lewis, ed. The Imjin Waeran – Hideyoshi’s Invasion of 
Korea: Problems and Perspectives (Honolulu) (forthcoming). 




Thus, by the time of Hideyoshi’s invasion of Korea, the Chinese 
were not entirely at ease with the idea of investing large sums of money for 
Korea’s defense. In the end, the Ming court did so, but entirely for 
pragmatic reasons. Emperor Wanli convinced his ministers that Japan's 
encroachment had to be thwarted; otherwise, China could expect another 
surge of wakō attacks. Moreover, China needed Korea’s support against 
another mutual enemy, i.e. Jurchen steppe people who raided their shared 
northern borders. Jurchen chieftains often played the Chinese and Koreans 
off against one another with pledges of loyalty to both sides in order to gain 
‘tribute’ gifts, and then used leverage to exact more gifts from the other. 
Chinese-Korean cooperation here was essential. 
The 1592 Japanese invasion became a seven year war fought 
exclusively on Korean territory, and ended as a series of stalemates for all 
the belligerents. In the conflict’s first phase, China learned that it could not 
employ calvary forces on Korea’s mountainous terrain, as inclimate weather 
made the manoeuvring of men and supply lines near impossible. A second 
major Chinese offensive with strong Korean support in spring 1593 resulted 
in a deadlock which lasted some four years. During that 
time, negotiators representing China and Japan tried to come to a modus 
vivendi, but the Koreans were excluded from all the discussions, and their 
wishes clearly ignored. It would seem that China focused on a mediated 
peace with Japan, and neglected the interests of its tributary vassal. By 1597, 
war resumed because Hideyoshi could not accept China’s peace terms, and 
Korea once again became a bloody battlefield, with huge civilian casualties. 
The three combattants all fought hard and bravely, and the confrontation 
was headed for yet another impasse when Hideyoshi suddenly died in 1598, 
and there was no Japanese successor to continue the assault. 
This war devastated Korea, which still after 400 years considers it the 
most cataclysmic event in its history. The Chinese alliance is 
commemorated in countless Korean shrines and temples, but the greatest 
praise is reserved for its own heroes who overcame 
incredible odds. Interestingly, Korea and Japan quickly resumed ‘tributary 
trade’ after 1598, and China recognized the new Tokugawa regime, but as 
before, did not allow Japan the privilege of tribute. It would seem that the 
East Asian world order, with its tributary rhetoric countered by political and 
commercial realities, was once again in operation. There is much to learn 
from this episode that helps us to comprehend the wider world of Sino-
foreign relations in the past, present, and future. 
